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People tend to associate the abstract concepts of “good” and “bad” with their fluent and
disfluent sides of space, as determined by their natural handedness or by experimental
manipulation (Casasanto, 2011). Here we investigated influences of spatial perspective tak-
ing on the spatialization of “good” and “bad.” In the first experiment, participants indicated
where a schematically drawn cartoon character would locate “good” and “bad” stimuli.
Right-handers tended to assign “good” to the right and “bad” to the left side of egocentric
space when the character shared their spatial perspective, but when the character was
rotated 180˚ this spatial mapping was reversed: good was assigned to the character’s right
side, not the participant’s.The tendency to spatialize valence from the character’s perspec-
tive was stronger in the second experiment, when participants were shown a full-featured
photograph of the character. In a third experiment, most participants not only spatialized
“good” and “bad” from the character’s perspective, they also based their judgments on a
salient attribute of the character’s body (an injured hand) rather than their own body. Tak-
ing another’s spatial perspective encourages people to compute space-valence mappings
using an allocentric frame of reference, based on the fluency with which the other person
could perform motor actions with their right or left hand. When people reason from their
own spatial perspective, their judgments depend, in part, on the specifics of their bodies;
when people reason from someone else’s perspective, their judgments may depend on
the specifics of the other person’s body, instead.
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INTRODUCTION
Across many cultures, the right side is associated with things that
are good and lawful, and the left side with things that are dirty,
bad, or prohibited. The association of “good” with “right” and
“bad” with “left” is evident in positive and negative idioms like
“my right-hand man” and “two left feet,” and in the meanings of
English words derived from the Latin for “right” (dexter) and“left”
(sinister).
Beyond patterns in language, people also implicitly associate
positively and negatively valenced ideas with “right” and “left” –
but not always in the way that linguistic and cultural conventions
suggest. Rather, associations between valence and left-right space
depend on the way people use their hands (Casasanto, 2009, 2011).
When asked to decide which of two products to buy, which of two
job applicants to hire, or which of two alien creatures looks more
honest, intelligent, or attractive, right- and left-handers tend to
respond differently: right-handers tend to prefer the product, per-
son, or creature presented on their right side, but left-handers tend
to prefer the one on their left (Casasanto, 2009). This pattern per-
sists even when people make judgments orally, without using their
hands to respond. Children as young as 5 years old already make
evaluations according to handedness and spatial location, judging
animals shown on their dominant side to be nicer and smarter
than animals on their non-dominant side (Casasanto and Henetz,
2012).
The implicit association between valence and left-right space
influences people’s memory and their motor responses, as well as
their judgments. In one experiment, participants were shown the
locations of fictitious positive and negative events on a map, and
asked to recall the locations later. Memory errors were predicted
by the valence of the event and the handedness of the partici-
pant: right-handers were biased to locate positive events too far
to the right and negative events too far to the left on the map,
whereas left-handers showed the opposite biases (Brunyé et al.,
2012). In reaction time tasks, right- and left-handers were faster
to classify words as positive when responding by pressing a button
with their dominant hand, and faster to classify words as negative
when responding with their non-dominant hand (de la Vega et al.,
2012).
Associations of handedness with valence and space have been
observed beyond the laboratory, in the speech and gestures of
right- and left-handed US presidential candidates during televised
debates (Casasanto and Jasmin, 2010). In right-handers, right-
hand gestures were more strongly associated with positive-valence
speech than left-hand gestures, and left-hand gestures were more
strongly associated with negative-valence speech than right-hand
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gestures; the opposite associations between hand and valence were
found in left-handers, despite the centuries-old tradition of train-
ing public speakers to gesture with the right hand for good things
and the left hand for bad things (or not to use the left hand at all;
Quintilianus, 1920).
Together, these data from studies using questionnaires, reac-
tion time tasks, map tasks, and spontaneous gestures suggest that
the association of positivity and negativity with people’s domi-
nant and non-dominant sides of space are habitually activated,
with a high degree of automaticity, when people evaluate the pos-
itivity of stimuli or recall information with a positive or negative
valence. These findings provide one line of support for Casasanto’s
(2009, 2011) body-specificity hypothesis: if the content of the mind
depends, in part, on the way we interact with the environment
with our bodies, then people with different kinds of bodies should
tend to think differently, in predictable ways.
The body-specific association of valence with left-right space
is robust, but it is also flexible. Casasanto (2009) proposed that
people come to associate “positive” with their dominant side of
space because they can usually interact with their physical environ-
ment more fluently on this side, using their dominant hand. This
proposal follows from the finding that fluent perceptuo-motor
interactions with the environment generally lead to more posi-
tive feelings, whereas disfluent interactions lead to more negative
feelings and evaluations (e.g., Reber et al., 1998; Beilock and Holt,
2007; Oppenheimer, 2008; Ping et al., 2009). To test whether man-
ual motor fluency drives associations between valence and space,
Casasanto and Chrysikou (2011) studied how people think about
“good” and “bad” after their dominant hand had been impaired,
reversing the usual asymmetry in motor fluency between their
right and left hands. This reversal of motor fluency resulted in a
reversal of behavioral responses: right-handers whose right hand
was impaired permanently by a unilateral stroke, or temporarily by
wearing a cumbersome glove on the right hand in the laboratory,
tended to associate “good” with the left side of space, like natural
left-handers.
The finding that even a few minutes of experiencing a reversed
motor asymmetry can completely reverse people’s usual judg-
ments about the spatial mapping of valence has several impli-
cations. First, it shows that motor experience is sufficient to cause
people to associate “good” with one side of space or the other, at
least temporarily. Second, this finding supports a proposal at the
heart of body-specificity: context shapes thinking, and the body is
an ever-present part of the context in which we use our minds. To
the extent that the body provides a stable context, the body-specific
representations that people form are likely to appear stable over
time; to the extent that body-relevant aspects of the context change,
representations they activate may change accordingly (Casasanto,
2011).
To date, the body-specificity hypothesis has been tested with
participants in isolating contexts: People’s brains and behaviors
have been measured while they were interacting primarily with a
piece of paper (Casasanto, 2009; Casasanto and Chrysikou, 2011;
Casasanto and Henetz, 2012) or a computer screen (Willems et al.,
2009, 2010; Brunyé et al., 2012; de la Vega et al., 2012), or while
making monologic statements into a television camera (Casasanto
and Jasmin, 2010). Perhaps as a consequence, the data suggest that
in all of these previous studies people’s body-specific neural and
mental representations have been computed from an egocentric
perspective. That is, at least by default, people tend to imagine
actions (Willems et al., 2009) and understand the meanings of
action verbs (Willems et al., 2010) based on the way they would
perform these actions with their own bodies, and they tend to acti-
vate associations between space and valence based on the long- or
short-term constraints of their own manual motor fluency, using
an egocentric spatial frame of reference (Casasanto, 2011).
Yet, in the richer physical and social world outside of the lab or
the television studio, other people often feature prominently in the
contexts in which we use our minds, and people often adopt other
people’s mental or spatial perspectives. When communicating spa-
tial information to another person, people frequently describe
things from the recipient’s spatial perspective rather than their
own (Schober, 1993, 1995; Mainwaring et al., 2003). Of particular
relevance, people may spontaneously take the spatial perspective
of another person depicted in a photograph when reasoning about
“right” and “left,” especially when action is implied (Tversky and
Hard, 2009). In face-to-face interactions, listeners tend to mimic
the speaker’s bodily movements mirror-wise: if the speaker leans
to her right, listeners lean to their left, so as to move in the same
absolute direction as the speaker (but the opposite direction in
body-centered space), suggesting that they spontaneously adopt
an allocentric spatial perspective (Bavelas et al., 1988).
The present study investigates the consequences of spatial
perspective-taking on the body-specific spatial mapping of “good”
and “bad.”Although initial tests of the body-specificity hypothesis
have focused on the role of one’s own body in shaping thoughts,
feelings, and judgments, the idea that all thinking occurs from an
egocentric perspective is ruled out by the studies reviewed above.
Casasanto et al. have suggested that people may sometimes repre-
sent other people’s actions allocentrically, in terms of the specifics
of their bodies, which are either observed or assumed (e.g., see
Willems et al., 2010, p. 73; Beveridge et al., 2012). There is no
doubt that people can change spatial perspectives flexibly. Here
we investigated how perspective-taking interacts with the bod-
ily characteristics of the participant and of a depicted “other”
to determine judgments about the left-right mapping of “good”
and “bad.”
Do people only compute space-valence mappings on the basis
of their own bodily characteristics, or can they also compute these
mappings on the basis of another person’s bodily characteristics
(observed or assumed), when asked to reason about the other
person’s choices? To find out, in three experiments, we asked right-
handed participants to perform a simple diagram task, adapted
from Casasanto (2009). Participants saw a character named Bob
in the center of a screen in between two boxes, one on the partici-
pant’s left and the other on their right. They were asked to indicate
which box Bob would put “good” things in, and which box he
would put “bad” things in. For half of the participants, Bob was
facing the same direction that they were (Shared Perspective con-
dition: Bob’s right was the participant’s right), and for the other
half Bob was facing the opposite direction (Opposite Perspective
condition: Bob’s right was the participant’s left). All participants
were instructed to reason about Bob’s placement of good and bad
things taking Bob’s perspective.
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In previous experiments, Bob was always facing the same direc-
tion as the participants. Results showed a strong tendency for
left-handers to say that Bob would place good things on their
left, and for right-handers to say that he would place good things
on their right. This basic result in the “Bob” task has been repli-
cated across seven experiments, conducted on three continents
(Casasanto, 2009; Casasanto and Chrysikou, 2011; de la Fuente
et al., 2011). We therefore expected that in the Shared Perspective
condition, right-handers would tend to assign good things to the
box on their right.
For the Opposite Perspective condition, we sought to distin-
guish two possibilities. First, participants could still tend to assign
good things to the box on their right side. This would suggest
that people’s judgments about the spatial mapping of valence are
entirely egocentric: regardless of Bob’s spatial perspective (and of
the explicit instructions to consider it), participants’ own motor
fluency determines their responses. Alternatively, right-handed
participants could tend to assign good things to the box on their
left. This would suggest that participants are adopting an allocen-
tric perspective, and reasoning about Bob’s preferences on the basis
of his motor capacities – on the assumption (perhaps implicit) that
Bob is a right-hander, which is true of about 90% of the population
(Coren, 1992).
EXPERIMENT 1: PUTTING BODY-SPECIFIC SPACE-VALENCE
MAPPINGS IN PERSPECTIVE
Experiment 1 provided an initial test of the effect of spatial per-
spective on the left-right mapping of emotional valence, first
using a simple cartoon character as in previous “Bob” exper-
iments (Experiment 1a), and second using a more naturalis-
tic color photograph of “Bob,” to facilitate perspective-taking
(Experiment 1b).
EXPERIMENT 1A
Methods
Participants. Three hundred adults (over 18 years old by self
report) were recruited anonymously via Amazon Mechanical Turk,
and participated online, for payment.
Materials and procedure. Materials and procedure were adapted
from Casasanto (2009, Experiment 3). After providing informed
consent, participants performed a two-question diagram task
that has been shown to elicit contrasting space-valence judg-
ments in right- and left-handers (Casasanto, 2009; Casasanto and
Chrysikou, 2011; de la Fuente et al., 2011). Participants saw a
cartoon character’s head in the center of the screen between two
empty boxes, one on the participants’ right and the other on their
left. They were told that the character, named Bob, loves zebras
and thinks they are good, but hates pandas and thinks they are
bad (or vice versa, with the assignment of valence to the animals
counterbalanced across participants). Participants were asked to
indicate where Bob would put each of the animals if he were going
to put the good animal in one box and the bad animal in the other,
by clicking inside one box and then the other. The order in which
participants were asked to locate the good and bad animals was
counterbalanced, to ensure that any associations between space
and valence were not confounded with numerical or temporal
order.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two versions
of the experiment. For half of the participants, Bob was facing
the same direction that they were (Shared Perspective condition;
Figure 1B), and for the other half Bob was facing the opposite
direction (Opposite Perspective condition; Figure 1A). All partic-
ipants were instructed to take Bob’s perspective when reasoning
about his placement of the good and bad animals, as in previ-
ous written versions of the “Bob” experiment (Casasanto, 2009,
Experiments 1–2).
After completing the diagram task, participants answered two
filler questions, and then provided a brief rationale for where they
thought Bob would place the “good” animal. They then completed
the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI) (Oldfield, 1971), with
one added item:“Which hand do you use a computer mouse with?”
This question was not used in calculating the EHI score, and was
included for exploratory purposes to inform future studies. Finally,
FIGURE 1 | Stimuli used in Experiment 1a for the Opposite Perspective
condition [(A), top] and the Shared Perspective condition [(B), bottom].
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to determine whether participants were capable of taking Bob’s
perspective accurately, we showed them Figure 1A and asked them
to click on the box on the right (or left, randomly determined),
from Bob’s point of view. Participants were then given an optional
demographic questionnaire.
Design. The design of the experiment included three factors of
interest [Valence (Good animal, Bad animal), Space (Left box,
Right box), and Perspective (Shared perspective, Opposite per-
spective)], as well as two factors not of interest [Animal assignment
(Panda=Good, Zebra=Good) and Question order (Positive ani-
mal first, Negative animal first)], resulting in a 2× 2× 2× 2× 2
design. Ideally, the design would also include a fourth factor of
interest: the handedness of the participant, which would add (in
the simplest case) another binary factor. However, given the rate
of left-handers in the population, about 10%, we estimated that
we would need a sample size of at least 1,000 participants in order
to have a sufficient number of left-handers randomly assigned to
each cell of the design. Fortunately, the design allows the effect
of perspective-taking to be evaluated within a single handed-
ness group, so rather than collecting a much larger sample, we
decided to exclude data from all non-right-handed participants
(EHI< 40).
Results and discussion
Left-handers (n= 23) and ambidextrous participants (n= 61)
were excluded, leaving only right-handed participants (n= 209).
Among right-handers, 91% of participants correctly answered the
perspective-taking manipulation check. Of these 191 participants,
15 did not click inside of either box on the test items, so their data
could not be analyzed. This left 176 participants whose data were
analyzed: 85 participants in the Opposite Perspective condition
and 91 in the Shared Perspective condition.
Throughout these results, we will refer to the placement of the
“good” animal from the participant’s perspective (i.e., egocentric
right and left). In the Shared Perspective condition, the major-
ity (63%) of participants placed the “good” animal on their right
(57 right= good vs. 34 left= good, sign test p= 0.02), replicating
previous findings in right-handers. By contrast, in the Opposite
Perspective condition, the pattern was reversed, though only mar-
ginally significant, with the majority (60%) of participants placing
the “good” animal on their left (i.e., on Bob’s right: 51 left= good
vs. 34 right= good, sign test p= 0.08). A binary logistic regression
confirmed the significant effect of Perspective condition on place-
ment of the “good” animal (Wald χ2= 8.86, df= 1, p= 0.003,
OR= 2.52, 95% CI= 1.37 – 4.61), indicating that participants in
the Opposite Perspective condition were about 2.5 times more
likely to place the “good” animal on Bob’s right than participants
in the Shared Perspective condition (Figure 2).
Analyses of the debriefing data showed that, of the participants
included in the main analysis, 25% justified their assignment of
the“good”animal to the right or left box on the basis of either their
own handedness or Bob’s handedness. This rate was surprisingly
high: in previous versions of this task, the percent of participants
who explained their responses in terms of handedness has ranged
from 5 (de la Fuente et al., 2011, Experiment 2) to 14% (Casasanto,
2009, Experiment 2). We do not know why the rate of debriefing
responses mentioning handedness was higher in this study than
in previous studies that used different versions of the same task.
One possibility is that our Amazon Mechanical Turk participants,
who were completing the study at their leisure, took more time
to reflect on possible explanations for their choices than partic-
ipants in previous studies, who were tested in the laboratory or
in face-to-face conversations with the experimenter, and whose
most frequent debriefing response in some studies was “I don’t
know.” On this account, the increased mentions of handedness
during the debriefing may not indicate that a greater proportion
of participants were conscious of making their choices on the
basis of handedness during the task; rather, these debriefing data
could indicate that a greater proportion of participants gener-
ated a handedness-related explanation post hoc, given sufficient
time to reflect on their responses. On another possibility, some of
the participants in the present study may have been familiar with
the idea of handedness-based space-valence associations which,
since they were first reported in 2009, have been described several
times in high-circulation newspapers and magazines. Whatever
the correct explanation may be, we note that similar patterns
of responses were found in participants who mentioned hand-
edness during the debriefing as in those who did not. When
Debriefing Response (Mentioned handedness, Did not mention
handedness) was added to the binary logistic regression model,
it did not interact with Perspective to predict the side of partici-
pants’“good animal” responses (Waldχ2= 2.04, df= 1, p= 0.15),
and the effect of Perspective was still significant when the interac-
tion of Perspective and Debriefing Response was controlled (Wald
χ2= 4.51, p= 0.03, OR= 2.02, 95% CI= 1.06 – 3.86).
In summary, when right-handed participants shared their
visuo-spatial perspective with Bob, they tended to indicate that
Bob would place the “good” animal on their (mutual) right side.
By contrast, when Bob was rotated 180˚ such that his perspective
was opposite the participants’, they tended to indicate that Bob
would place the good animal on his right, which was their own
left side. It appears that the association of “good” with the right
side is not restricted to the egocentric right; rather, when asked
to consider another’ person’s perspective, right-handers will apply
the same “good is right” mapping for someone else’s point of view.
Overall, the effect of perspective on participants’ judgments was
highly significant, but we note that the effect in the condition of
greatest interest (Opposite Perspective) was only marginally sig-
nificant, perhaps because people are not accustomed to computing
the spatial perspective of a schematic, disembodied cartoon head,
viewed from above. In Experiment 1b, we repeated this experiment
using a full-featured photograph of “Bob,” viewed from either the
back (Shared Perspective) or the front (Opposite Perspective), rea-
soning that the richer, more naturalistic stimulus could enhance
the perspective-taking effect found in Experiment 1a.
EXPERIMENT 1B
Methods
Participants. Three hundred new participants from Amazon
Mechanical Turk participated, for payment.
Design, materials, and procedure. The design, materials, and
procedure were identical to Experiment 1a with the following
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FIGURE 2 | Results of Experiment 1a. The dashed line at 50% represents chance responding. “Good=Left” and “Good=Right” are coded from the
participant’s perspective. Error bars indicate SEM.
exceptions: each participant saw one of the images in Figure 3,
depicting a full-featured “Bob” rather than an abstract line
drawing.
Results and discussion
After removing left-handed (n= 13) and ambidextrous partici-
pants (n= 59) there were 222 right-handed participants, 214 of
whom (96%) passed the perspective-taking manipulation check.
Of these participants, 6 failed to click inside the boxes, leaving 208
right-handed participants whose data could be analyzed: 112 in the
Shared Perspective condition and 96 in the Opposite Perspective
condition.
In the Shared Perspective condition, the majority (78%) of par-
ticipants indicated that the “good” animal should be placed in the
box on their right (87 good= right vs. 25 good= left, sign test
p= 0.001). In the Opposite Perspective condition, the majority
(73%) of participants indicated that the “good” animal should be
placed in the box on their left (Bob’s right) (70 good= left vs.
26 good= right, sign test p= 0.001). A binary logistic regression
confirmed the effect of Perspective condition on the placement of
the “good” animal (Waldχ2= 48.02, df= 1, p= 0.001, OR= 9.37,
95% CI= 4.98 – 17.64) indicating that participants in the Oppo-
site Perspective condition were almost 10 times more likely to place
the “good” animal on Bob’s right than participants in the Shared
Perspective condition (Figure 4).
Analyses of the debriefing data showed that, of the partici-
pants included in the main analysis, 42% justified their assignment
of the “good” animal to the right or left box on the basis of
either their own handedness or Bob’s handedness. In a further
analysis, Debriefing Response (Mentioned handedness, Did not
mention handedness) was added to the binary logistic regression
model. There was a significant interaction between Debriefing
Response and Perspective (Wald χ2= 14.64, df= 1, p= 0.001,
OR= 21.82, 95% CI= 4.50 – 105.83), indicating that the effect of
Perspective was stronger in participants who explicitly mentioned
handedness (Waldχ2= 37.14, df= 1, p= 0.001, OR= 75.20, 95%
CI= 18.74 – 301.74) than in those who did not, but the effect of
Perspective remained significant in the majority of participants
who did not mention handedness (Wald χ2= 10.45, p= 0.001,
OR= 3.45, 95% CI= 1.63 – 7.30). Pairwise differences between
the number of “Good= Left” and “Good=Right” responses were
FIGURE 3 | Stimuli used in Experiment 1b for the Opposite Perspective
condition [(A), top] and the Shared Perspective condition [(B), bottom].
significant in both the Shared and Opposite Perspective condi-
tions, regardless of whether participants mentioned handedness
in the debriefing (Table 1).
The results of Experiment 1b corroborate those of Experiment
1a: when right-handers share Bob’s spatial perspective, they tend
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FIGURE 4 | Results of Experiment 1b. The dashed line at 50% represents chance responding. “Good=Left” and “Good=Right” are coded from the
participant’s perspective. Error bars indicate SEM.
Table 1 | Judgments from participants who did and did not mention
handedness when justifying their responses in Experiment 1b.
Cited
handedness
Perspective
condition
Good=Left Good=Right Sign
test
Yes (n=88) Shared 4 47 p=0.001
Opposite 32 5 p=0.001
No (n=120) Shared 21 40 p=0.02
Opposite 38 21 p=0.04
“Good=Left” and “Good=Right” are coded from the participant’s perspective.
to assign the “good” animal to the box on their right and the “bad”
animal to the box on their left. By contrast, when asked to decide
where a 180˚-rotated Bob would place the animals, participants
tend to assign the “good” animal to the box on their left and the
“bad” animal to the box on their right.
In order to compare the strength of the effect of Perspec-
tive between Experiments 1a and 1b, we conducted an additional
binary logistic regression adding Experiment to the model used in
the main analysis. The interaction of Perspective (Shared, Oppo-
site) and Experiment (1a, 1b) was significant (Wald χ2= 8.64,
df= 1, p= 0.003, OR= 3.73, 95% CI= 1.55 – 8.96), indicating
that the effect of perspective-taking effect on the spatialization of
valence was stronger in Experiment 1b than Experiment 1a, pre-
sumably because participants were able to compute space-valence
relationships more easily or more automatically when shown a
more lifelike depiction of Bob.
As in previous tests of body-specific space-valence associations,
here participants’ judgments appear to follow the“dominant side is
good”mapping (whether they activate this association consciously
or unconsciously). On the simplest interpretation of these data,
when Bob shares their point of view, participants compute “left”
and “right” from an egocentric spatial perspective, and when Bob
has the opposite point of view, participants compute “left” and
“right” from an allocentric spatial perspective.
Yet, there is an alternative to this conclusion. The data from the
Opposite Perspective condition are consistent with participants
computing “left” and “right” allocentrically, from Bob’s 180′-
rotated viewpoint, based on Bob’s bodily characteristics – assuming
(perhaps implicitly) that Bob is a right-hander, which is true of
about 90% of the population (Coren, 1992). But the data are also
consistent with the possibility that participants are not really con-
sidering Bob’s bodily characteristics, at all, and are instead adopt-
ing what we will call a “rotated egocentric” perspective: maybe
participants are projecting their own bodily characteristics onto
Bob (perhaps because they cast themselves in the “role” of Bob).
In which case, in the Opposite Perspective condition they would
assign the “good” animal to the box on their left, not because they
assume that Bob is a right-hander (based on the handedness sta-
tistics of the population), but rather because they themselves are
right-handed, and they compute space-valence associations based
on their own bodily characteristics even when asked to reason from
another person’s perspective.
Adopting a“rotated egocentric”perspective would be consistent
with other demonstrations of surprising egocentrism in adults, in
which experimental participants project their own bodily charac-
teristics onto another person. For example, in one set of experi-
ments, when asked to recall the eye color of well-known celebrities,
brown-eyed participants were biased to attribute brown-eyedness
to most of the stars tested, but blue-eyed participants were biased
to attribute blue-eyedness to the stars, despite the rarity of blue-
eyedness in the population (Casasanto and Staum Casasanto,
2011). This effect persisted when analyses were controlled for how
well participants knew the celebrities, how well they liked them,
and how confident participants were in their judgments: partici-
pants still tended to project their own bodily characteristics onto
other people. If such egocentric projection of one’s own bodily
traits onto others accounts for the results of the Opposite Perspec-
tive condition here, it would be inappropriate to conclude that
switching points of view caused participants to spatialize valence
from an allocentric perspective, based on Bob’s (assumed) bodily
characteristics.
One way to distinguish between the “allocentric” and “rotated
egocentric” possibilities would be to repeat Experiment 1 in
left-handers. If participants reason about Bob’s choices from
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an allocentric perspective, then right- and left-handers should
respond similarly in the Opposite Perspective condition, since both
groups should assume that Bob is a right-hander, based on the sta-
tistics of the population. Alternatively, if participants reason from a
rotated egocentric perspective, then right- and left-handers should
show opposite patterns of responses in the Opposite Perspec-
tive condition: right-handers should impute right-handedness to
Bob and choose the box on their left, but left-handers should
impute left-handedness to Bob and choose the box on their right.
Yet, there are practical and theoretical limitations to this pro-
posed test. Practically speaking, a very large sample would be
needed in order to recruit a sufficient number of left-handers from
the general population. Theoretically, these imagined data would
still be correlational, and therefore subject to speculations about
other unexamined differences between right- and left-handers’
judgments.
In order to distinguish between the “allocentric” and “rotated
egocentric” possibilities while addressing both of these concerns,
for Experiment 2 we conducted a true experimental manipula-
tion in right-handers, randomly assigning them to make judg-
ments about Bob’s preference when provided with a highly salient
indicator of his manual motor fluency with his right vs. left hand.
EXPERIMENT 2: ARE PARTICIPANT’S REASONING ON THE
BASIS OF BOB’S BODY OR THEIR OWN?
In order to determine whether participants in Experiment 1 were
making judgments based on Bob’s bodily characteristics or their
own, in Experiment 2 we asked right-handers to judge where Bob
would place the good and bad animals while viewing a picture of
him that made it easy to tell whether he could act more fluently
with his right or left hand. Bob (viewed from either the front or
the back) wore a sling on either his right or left arm, indicating
that either his left hand was temporarily impaired (making him
functionally a right-hander) or his right hand was impaired (mak-
ing him functionally a left-hander; see Casasanto and Chrysikou,
2011; Figure 5).
If participants can reason about Bob’s spatialization of “good”
and “bad” from a genuinely allocentric perspective, on the basis of
Bob’s bodily characteristics, then in both the Shared Perspective
and the Opposite Perspective conditions participants assigned to
see Bob as functionally left-handed (sling on right arm) should
respond differently from those assigned to see him as functionally
right-handed (sling on left arm), since in all cases the sling makes it
apparent which side is Bob’s“good”side (i.e., his fluent side). Alter-
natively, if participants reason about Bob’s choices from a rotated
egocentric perspective, projecting their own bodily characteristics
onto Bob, then the sling should have no effect on participants’
judgments. As in Experiment 1, in the Shared Perspective con-
dition right-handed participants should put the good animal on
their right, and in the Opposite Perspective condition they should
put the good animal on their left (Bob’s right), regardless of which
arm the sling appeared on.
METHODS
Participants
Six hundred new participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk
participated, for payment.
Design, materials, and procedure
The design, materials, and procedure were identical to those in
Experiment 1b, with the following exception: participants were
randomly assigned to see one of the photographs in Figure 5, in
which Bob, viewed from either the front or the back, wore a sling
on either the right arm or the left.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Of the 469 right-handed participants who produced codable
responses, 450 (96%) answered the perspective-taking manip-
ulation check question correctly. According to a binary logistic
regression, Perspective (Shared, Opposite), and Sling Arm (Right,
Left) interacted to predict participants’ placement of the good
animal in the box on their right or left (Wald χ2= 113.86, df= 1,
p= 0.0001, OR= 157.57, 95% CI= 62.21 – 399.11). Binary logis-
tic regressions were then conducted for each Perspective condition,
as well as sign tests for each condition.
Figure 6 shows the assignment of the “good” animal in each
condition. In the Opposite Perspective condition, when the sling
was on Bob’s left arm, participants (n= 105) put the“good”animal
on their left 84% of the time (88 good= left vs. 17 good= right,
sign test p= 0.001). When the sling was on Bob’s right arm, par-
ticipants (n= 107) put the good animal on their left only 22% of
the time (24 good= left vs. 83 good= right, sign test p= 0.001;
Wald χ2= 67.17, p= 0.001, OR= 17.90, 95% CI= 8.98 – 35.69).
In the Shared Perspective condition, when the sling was
on Bob’s left arm, participants (n= 112) put the “good” ani-
mal on their right 80% of the time (90 good= right vs. 22
good= left, sign test p= 0.001), whereas when the sling was on
Bob’s right arm (n= 104), participants put the good animal on
their right only 32% of the time (33 good= right vs. 71 good= left,
sign test p= 0.001; Wald χ2= 46.86, p= 0.001, OR= 8.80, 95%
CI= 4.72 – 16.41).
In summary, in both the Shared Perspective and Opposite
Perspective conditions, the majority of participants assigned the
“good” animal to Bob’s fluent side of space, that is, the side
ipsilateral to his sling-free arm. Results suggest that participants
in the Opposite Perspective condition were adopting a genuine
allocentric perspective, not a rotated egocentric perspective, and
basing their judgments on Bob’s bodily characteristics rather than
their own.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In two experiments, we demonstrated that taking another person’s
perspective can influence judgments about the spatial mapping
of emotional valence. In Experiment 1, when participants shared
the same spatial point of view as the cartoon character whose
preferences they were asked to reason about, the (right-handed)
participants tended to compute space-valence relationships ego-
centrically, showing the “good is right” bias found previously
in right-handers (Casasanto, 2009). That is, participants indi-
cated that the “good” side of space was the side on which they
could interact with the physical environment more fluently using
their dominant hand. When the participants’ point of view was
rotated 180˚ from the character’s, however, the spatial mapping
of valence was reversed: “Good” was assigned most often to the
character’s right side (i.e., the participant’s left). This effect of
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FIGURE 5 | Stimuli used in Experiment 2. Each participant saw only one of these four images.
FIGURE 6 | Results of Experiment 2. The top two bars show the
results when the sling was on Bob’s left arm, and the bottom two bars
show results when the sling was on Bob’s right arm. The dashed line at
50% represents chance responding. “Good=Left” and
“Good=Right” are coded from the participant’s perspective. Error bars
indicate SEM.
spatial perspective was strengthened when the cartoon charac-
ter used in Experiment 1a was replaced with a color photograph
of a man (Experiment 1b), presumably because the full-featured
photograph enabled participants to compute space-valence rela-
tionships from the character’s perspective more easily or more
automatically.
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The results of Experiment 1 were compatible with two possi-
bilities: when participants computed space-valence relationships
they could have been adopting an allocentric perspective, basing
their judgments on the character’s bodily characteristics (assum-
ing, perhaps implicitly, that the character was right-handed, like
the 90% majority of people). Alternatively, they could have been
adopting a “rotated egocentric” perspective, projecting their own
handedness onto the character or putting themselves in his shoes,
and basing their judgments on their own bodily characteristics. In
Experiment 2, the character’s hand dominance could be inferred
unambiguously. Results clearly indicated that participants’ were
adopting an allocentric perspective: they spatialized “good” and
“bad” on the basis of the character’s bodily characteristics, not
their own.
Is it possible that the results of these experiments were artifacts
of the particular task used, in which participants were explicitly
asked to spatialize “good” and “bad,” and to use their hands when
responding? For example, could clicking the mouse on one’s dom-
inant side of the screen have been easier than clicking on the other
side, leading to a trivial association between space and valence? It
is unlikely that such task characteristics can explain these results,
for several reasons. First, there is no reason to believe that using
the mouse with one’s dominant hand should cause participants
to prefer to click in a particular box, or that it was easier to click
in one box vs. the other. Furthermore, even if responding with
the mouse did bias people toward responding on one side of the
screen (e.g., if it were slightly easier to click on one side than the
other), the fact that participants’ preferred box reversed according
to whether Bob was facing toward them or away from them defin-
itively rules out any explanation for their responses based on the
location of the mouse, or how easy it was to click in the right or
left box.
More broadly, across previous studies using the “Bob goes to
the zoo” task, results obtained in versions of that task that required
manual responses (e.g., Casasanto, 2009, Experiments 1–2) have
been statistically indistinguishable from results of “hands-free”
versions that only required oral responses (e.g., Casasanto, 2009,
Experiment 3; de la Fuente et al., 2011), addressing concerns
about the use of the hands during this task. More broadly still, we
note that the fluency-based body-specific association of left-right
space and valence has been shown in a wide variety of tasks with
diverse dependent measures (e.g., diagram tasks, forced-choice
questionnaires, reaction time tasks,visual-hemifield tasks, location
memory tasks, analyses of spontaneous gestures), and in diverse
populations including healthy right- and left-handed adults from
the USA, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, and Morocco, as well
as hemiparesis patients, children as young as 5 years old, and US
presidential candidates who did not know that they were exper-
imental “participants” (Casasanto, 2009; Casasanto and Jasmin,
2010; Brookshire and Casasanto, 2011; Casasanto and Chrysikou,
2011; de la Fuente et al., 2011; Brunyé et al., 2012; Casasanto and
Henetz, 2012; de la Vega et al., 2012).
We acknowledge, however, that this study is only a first test
of the effects of spatial perspective on left-right valence associa-
tions. It would be useful to corroborate these results with further
tests that use more implicit dependent measures, which could
rule out other potential task-based explanations. For example,
an anonymous reviewer suggested this alternative account of the
findings of Experiment 2: rather than reasoning about “good” and
“bad” from Bob’s perspective, participants could have used a sim-
ple matching strategy, matching the good animal with the “good”
(i.e., uninjured) side of Bob’s body. Although our data cannot rule
out this possibility, such an explanation cannot account for the
perspective-taking evident in Experiment 1, or the results of the
several previous versions of the“Bob goes to the zoo”task reviewed
above.
One question left open by this study is: to what extent do people
take another’s spatial point of view spontaneously, and therefore
reason about space and valence from an allocentric perspective,
based on characteristics of the other person’s body? In these experi-
ments, we explicitly instructed participants to adopt the character’s
perspective (and made sure they were capable of doing so cor-
rectly). Yet, even without explicit instruction, people routinely
represent the perspective of people with whom they interact face-
to-face, as is evidenced by studies of dialog (e.g., Schober, 1995),
gesture (McNeill, 1992), mimicry (Bavelas et al., 1988), and spa-
tial descriptions of pictures (Mainwaring et al., 2003; Tversky and
Hard, 2009). It is likely, therefore, that allocentric reasoning about
space and valence may occur spontaneously.
Another open question is the extent to which people’s reasoning
about space and valence is constituted by modality-specific sim-
ulations of motor actions, and the fluency with which they could
be performed on one side of space or the other. Previous studies
show that people imagine actions and understand decontextual-
ized action verbs, in part, via motor simulations constructed from a
body-specific, egocentric perspective. That is, when asked to imag-
ine “grasping” or to read the verb “grasp,” right- and left-handers
preferentially activate motor areas in the hemisphere contralateral
to their dominant hand that are used for planning and performing
manual actions (Willems et al., 2009, 2010). There is clear evi-
dence that the body-specific spatialization of emotional valence
depends on an individual’s history of motor actions (Casasanto
and Chrysikou, 2011). It is not known, however, whether the
mental representations that underlie reasoning about the spatial
correlates of valence are constituted, in part, by motor simu-
lations: that is, motor simulations of actions as people would
perform them with their own bodies (when they adopt an egocen-
tric perspective), and motor simulations of relatively fluent and
disfluent actions as they would be performed by another (when
they adopt an allocentric perspective). Determining whether the
representations underlying behavioral effects like those we show
here include simulations in motor circuits that support acting with
the dominant and non-dominant hands will require more direct
observations of neural activity (e.g., using fMRI) or direct inter-
ventions on neural circuits that compute hand actions (e.g., using
rTMS or tDCS).
CONCLUSION
These experiments corroborate previous studies showing that the
spatial mapping of “good” and “bad” is body-specific. Further-
more, they show for the first time that the body this spatial
mapping is specific to is not necessarily one’s own. When we rea-
son from our own perspective, our judgments are conditioned by
the particulars of our bodies; when we reason from someone else’s
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perspective, our judgments may be conditioned by the particulars
of their bodies. The body shapes our thoughts, feelings, and judg-
ments because it is an ever-present part of the context in which
we use our minds (Casasanto, 2011). Other people are also an
important element of the context in which we do our thinking,
therefore thinking is sensitive to the specifics of their bodies, as
well as our own.
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